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COMMENT
OPENING THE DOOR BUT KEEPING
THE LIGHTS OFF: KUMHO TIRE Co.
V. CARMICHAEL AND THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE DAUBERT
TEST TO NONSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
"[Expert testimony] has done more than any one
rule.., to reduce our litigation towards a state
of legalized gambling."1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the use of expert testimony has increased dra-
matically.2 The specialized knowledge and experience that experts
possess about given topics make them invaluable tools for clarifying
and illustrating complex issues for judges and juries.3 This increase,
however, has been accompanied by a widespread, yet justified, para-
noia about the influence an expert can have on the outcome of a trial
and the use of "junk science" in the courtroom.4 More specifically,
1 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1929 (3d ed. 1978).
2 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDozo L REV. 2271, 2273 (1994); see also Edson McClellan, Comment, Sharpening the
Focus on Daubert's Distinction Between Scientific and Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 34 SAN
DIEGO L REV. 1719, 1721 (1997) (asserting that the use of expert testimony has increased
proportionately with the increase in technology in society); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence,
1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1118-19 (discussing the findings of a 1985-86 survey of 529 civil jury
trials in California Superior Courts). Another illustrative example of the use (or overuse) of
expert testimony can be found by examining the September 1999 issue of the American Bar
Association Journal. Of the total 162 advertisements in the classified section of the journal, 119
were experts soliciting work. These experts varied from construction consultants to bicycle
accident reconstruction artists and airplane cabin injury investigators. See A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999,
104-07; see also McClellan, supra, at n.6 (describing similar findings in the September 1996
edition of the ABA Journal).
3 See Kristina L. Needham, Note, Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testi-
mony After Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of
All Expert Testimony, 25 FORDHAMt URB. L J. 541,545 (1998).
4 See inwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2286; see also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COuRTROOM (1993) (providing an in- depth and revealing
analysis about the use of junk science in the courtroom). But see Scott C. Andre, Comment,
Weird Science: Problems with the U.S. Supreme Court's New Evidentiary Standard for Expert
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the problem is the way that judges, juries, and witnesses are often un-
duly persuaded by experts who possess impressive credentials.5 To
combat this "aura of infallibility," trial judges have the duty of de-
ciding which experts are relevant and reliable and, therefore, permit-
ted to testify. The task of determining the admissibility of expert tes-
timony becomes particularly daunting when a judge is required to
determine the reliability of testimony that is based on personal
knowledge and experience rather than principles of science and
mathematical formulas. The testimony of a number of experts, in-
cluding police officers,6 accountants, 7 bankers,8 farmers,9 and railroad
brakemen, 10 is based, to greater or lesser degrees, on practical experi-
ences rather than scientific principles.
Until recently, federal courts had no guidelines for determining
the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony. On March 23,
1999, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Kumho Tire
Testimony and Oregon Case Law as a Possible Solution, 73 OR. L. REv. 691, 692 (1994) (ar-
guing that the decision in Daubert will not end junk science for three reasons: (1) Daubert's
definition of "scientific knowledge" does not adequately address nonscientific expert testimony;
(2) it fails to offer definitive guidelines for courts to evaluate scientific expert testimony; and
(3) the decision places too heavy a burden on judges to determine good science).
5 The fear is that scientific testimony carries an "aura of infallibility" and that jurors will
lend more weight to expert testimony than other types of evidence. See Imwinkelried, supra
note 2, at 2286; see also McClellan, supra note 2, at 1722 (stating that "[j]uries have been ac-
cused of attributing a 'mystic infallibility' and 'aura of special reliability' to opinion evidence")
(citations omitted); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, National Mass Tort Conference: Is Science a
Special Case? The Admissibility Scientifc Evidence After Daubert v. Merrill Dow, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1779, 1798 (1995) ("Lacking the technical expertise to examine the validity of scientific
claims critically, jurors may find for the side with the most experts, the most presentable ex-
perts, or the prettiest charts."); Alan W. Tamarelli, Jr., Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals:
Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability - the Questionable Wisdom of Abandoning the Peer
Review Standardfor Admitting Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1175-76 (1994) ("When a
testifying expert professes to have a knowledge in a specialized field, juries often find sorting
out issues of credibility and relevance difficult and confusing."); see also Michael J. Polentz,
Comment, Post-Daubert Conjsion With Expert Testimony, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1187,
1204-05 (1986) (observing that "when the subject matter of a cause of action is beyond the
understanding of the jury, expert testimony becomes a powerful tool that has the potential to
sway a decision one way or the other").
6 See, e.g., Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994) (reversing the admis-
sion of expert testimony by a former sheriff about the use of deadly force by Detroit police
officers).
7 See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993) (revers-
ing the admission of the expert testimony of an accountant regarding the valuation of a corpora-
tion's assets).
8 See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Whiteny Nat'l Bank, 824 F. Supp. 587, 601 (E.D. La.
1993) (denied defendant's motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony of a commercial
banker regarding ordinary and normal banking transactions).
9 See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Hester, 765 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the district court did not err in permitting the testimony of farmers about corn faring and
potential crop yield).
10 See, e.g., Eckert v. Aliquippa & Southern Ry. Co., 828 F.2d 183, 185 & n.5 (3d Cir.




Co. v. Carmichael" in an effort to answer some of the lingering
questions about the use of nonscientific expert testimony left by Dau-
bert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals.12 In Daubert, the Court pro-
vided a framework for judges to use when deciding whether to admit
expert testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.13 The
"Daubert test" established a gatekeeping role for trial judges that re-
quires them to determine the relevance and reliability of scientific
expert testimony before allowing its admission.14 In the majority
opinion in Daubert, the Court addressed the issue of scientific expert
testimony, but failed to attend to the issue of nonscientific expert tes-
timony. 15 This omission left trial judges without guidance for dealing
with nonscientific evidence and resulted in inconsistency among fed-
eral courts on the standard of admissibility.16 In Kumho Tire, the
Court attempted to address those issues and settle any lingering
doubts regarding the admissibility of nonscientific evidence. How-
ever, Kumho Tire, like Daubert, left unanswered questions. The
Court concluded that the Daubert principles regarding scientific evi-
dence were generally applicable to nonscientific evidence-a conclu-
sion that forces trial judges to apply a standard initially created for
expert testimony based on science to less concrete and more tangen-
tial decisions based on perception and experience. Thus, judges are
left with a decision that simply does not seem to "fit."
This Comment critically examines the Kumho Tire decision, its
shortcomings, and the effects it will have on the future of the admis-
sibility of nonscientific expert testimony. Part I describes the history
leading up to the Kumho Tire decision and the legal standards previ-
ously used to determine the admissibility of nonscientific evidence. It
is important to understand the history of the use of expert testimony
in the courtroom because by recognizing the manner by which expert
testimony was evaluated in the past, it is easier to determine how ex-
pert testimony will be used after Kumho Tire. Part II critically ex-
amines the Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. A complete
" 119. Ct. 1167(1999).
12 509 U.S. 579 (1992).
1" Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
14 The Majority in Daubert wrote "the Rules of Evidence - especially Rule 702 - do
assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
15 Only in passing did the Daubert Court note that "Rule 702 also applies to 'technical, or
other specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is
the nature of the expertise offered here." LL at n.8.
16 See infra Part LIC.
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review of the decision and the guidelines devised by the Court is es-
sential in order to appreciate why the new standard is not a solution,
but rather a barrier to determining the admissibility of nonscientific
expert testimony. Part El sets forth reasons why the Court's decision
fails to address the true problems of applying the Daubert test to non-
scientific expert testimony. This final section offers some predictions
on how the Kumho decision will impact the admissibility of nonsci-
entific expert testimony, and also offers some suggestions for re-
working the standard.
I. BEFORE KUMHo TIRE: THE FRYE AND DA UBERT STANDARDS
A. United States v. Frye
Prior to the development of the standard set forth in Daubert and
Kumho Tire, most jurisdictions relied on the "Frye test" for deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony.17 In Frye v. United
States,18 James Frye appealed a second degree murder conviction on
the sole ground that the trial court excluded expert testimony regard-
ing the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test which, he
claimed, would have demonstrated his innocence.' 9 The systolic
blood pressure test was a crude precursor to the modem polygraph
test, and Frye offered an expert to testify that he passed the test as
proof that he did not commit the crime.20 Without offering any
precedent for the decision, the appellate court upheld the exclusion of
the testimony on the ground that the systolic blood pressure test was
not a "generally accepted" method of assessing truth-telling by
physiological and psychological authorities.21 The court held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
17 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2272. A minority of jurisdictions, however, rejected
the Frye test and developed alternatives. See Needham, supra note 3, at 547. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afid, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)
(rejecting the Frye test and developing the "substantial acceptance" test).
's 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19 See id. at 1013.




established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs. 2
Frye created a two-step test for assessing expert testimony. It re-
quired judges to: (1) identify the scientific field of the testifying ex-
pert, and (2) determine whether the principle or discovery was gener-
ally accepted in the field of study.2 Thus, Frye examined whether
the basis of the testimony was generally accepted in the scientific
community, not the reliability of the testimony itself.24
The standard articulated in Frye provided some practical bene-
fits. The "general acceptance" test deferred science to the scientific
community, and helped to avoid the difficult problems encountered
by judges and juries when they attempt to evaluate complicated and
often confusing expert opinion.2 Furthermore, the test offered assur-
ance that evidence would have an indicia of reliability by excluding
scientific evidence with only a minimal amount of scientific sup-
port-so-called "junk science."26
Nevertheless, Frye created an ultraconservative test that ex-
cluded expert testimony relating to novel or developing areas of sci-
ence, and in some cases, may have impeded the use of bona fide ex-
pert testimony.27 In addition, the Frye court's failure to clearly define
the term "general acceptance" may have caused substantial problems
with defining its boundaries, resulting in the exclusion of reliable tes-
28timony. Despite Frye's shortcomings, it became the law in almost
all jurisdictions and set the standard for the next seventy years.
B. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals
In Daubert, the plaintiffs were minor children born with serious
birth defects alleged to have been caused by their mothers' use of
Bendectin, a prescription antinausea drug for pregnant women mar-
22Id.
23 See Needham, supra note 3, at 544.
24 See id.
2 See Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence
After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 572 (1994) ("[U]sing the 'general acceptance' standard, courts
deferred to the scientific community and avoided the difficulties inherent in evaluating informa-
tion that was often extremely technical and highly confusing.") [hereinafter Standards and
Procedures]; see also Polentz, supra note 5, at 1190-1191 (stating that "one premise is that the
general acceptance test keeps the determination of whether a scientific theory is valid within the
scientific community, and thus shifts this burden of analysis away from the judge and jury"). Ld.
at 1190 (citation omitted).
26 See id.
27 See Needham, supra note 3, at 544-545; see also Standards and Procedures, 157
F.R.D. at 572 (noting that "in the view of many, the Frye 'general acceptance' test tended to
retard the admission of potentially useful scientific information").
28 See Needham, supra note 3 at 544-545.
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keted by the defendant.29 The defendant removed the suit to federal
court and moved for summary judgment based on an affidavit of a
physician/epidemiologist who claimed that a review of the relevant
literature revealed no studies finding Bendectin to be a human terato-
gen.30  The plaintiffs did not contest this conclusion, but presented
eight experts who contended the drug did cause malformations.3' The
District Court granted summary judgment for the defendant, stating
that the expert evidence offered by the plaintiffs was not generally
accepted in its field.32 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Frye v.
United States, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Blackmun, with a lone dis-
sent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court agreed with the petitioners
that the trial court's reliance on the Frye test was erroneous. The
majority found that Frye had been superceded by the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and specifically referenced Rule 702,
which governs the admissibility of expert testimony.34 The cited Rule
provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
a3
Upon review, the majority concluded that neither the text of the
rule nor its drafting history required general acceptance as a prerequi-
site to admissibility, nor was there any mention of Frye.36 Moreover,
such a rigid requirement would not comport with the "liberal thrust"
of the Federal Rules favoring the admission of relevant evidence.37
29 See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579,582 (1992).
3o See id. (noting that a human teratogen is "a substance capable of causing malformations
in fetuses").
31 See id. Their conclusions were based on "in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) ani-
mal studies that found such a link, pharmacological studies that demonstrated similarities in the
chemical structure of Bendectin and other substances known to cause birth defects, and the
"reanalysis" of previously published epidemiological (human statistical) studies. See id. at 583.
32 See id. The Court stated that it was difficult to justify the use of non-epidemiological
evidence given the vast amount of epidemiological evidence available; see also Daubert v.
Merrill Dow Pharm., 727 F. Supp. 570,572 (S.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1992).
3 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584-85.
34 See id. at 587.
35 FED. R. EvnD. 702.
36 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
37 See id. Justice Blackmun noted that Rule 401, which defines relevant evidence as
anything that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evi-




For these reasons, the majority concluded that Frye was superceded
by the Federal Rules of Evidence and would no longer apply in fed-
eral courts. 38 Although the Rules displaced Frye, the Court held that
the Federal Rules bestowed upon trial judges a "gatekeeping" role to
ensure that all scientific evidence admitted is both reliable and rele-
vant.
39
First, for scientific evidence to be reliable, the Court asserted that
Rule 702 requires an expert's testimony to consist of "scientific
knowledge."'  The adjective "scientific" suggests the use of scientific
methods and procedures, and the word "knowledge" implies testi-
mony that consists of more than subjective belief or speculation.4'
Thus, in order for testimony to qualify as scientific knowledge, the
Court stated it must be derived from the scientific method and sup-
ported by appropriate validation4 2 In the words of Justice Blackmun,
"the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific
knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."43 Sec-
ond, Blackiun stated that Rule 702 also requires that the scientific
evidence or testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue."44 This, he claimed, created a
standard of relevance for expert testimony. 5 In other words, Rule
702 requires a valid scientific connection to the inquiry at issue as a
"precondition to admissibility.
' 6
Unfortunately, the standard in Daubert, like the one in Frye, fo-
cused on something other than the actual results of the scientific evi-
dence. In Frye, the focus was whether the science was generally ac-
cepted in the particular field, not on the reliability of the testimony
itself.47 Similarly, Daubert also focused on the reliability of the
method from which the testimony was derived, not the reliability of
the testimony itself. a 8 Justice Blackmun's decision was based on the
31 See id. at 589.
31 See id.
40 See id. at 590.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 Id. ("[T]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' as inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate valida-
tion - i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.").
Il
44 See id. at 591 (quoting Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
41 See id.
46 See id. at 592. The Court also described the requirement as the evidence having to be
"fit." See id. at 591. That is, while testimony or evidence may be scientifically valid, it must
also be pertinent to the issue at hand. See id.
47 See Needham, supra note 3, at 554.
48 See Imwinkehied, supra note 2, at 2277; Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Fo-
cus" Seriously: The Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1746
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Newtonian concept that science is derived from a formulation of hy-
potheses, and the performance of experiments intended to test the va-
lidity of those hypotheses.49 Justice Blackmun reasoned that "good
science" is separated from "junk science" by evaluating how conclu-
sions are reached, not the substance of the conclusions itself.50 It was
this realization that prompted the Court to offer "general observa-
tions" regarding the appropriate application of this new standard.5' In
so doing, the Court identified four factors for trial judges to consider
when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence: (1) whether
the theory or scientific technique has been tested;52 (2) whether it has
been subject to peer review or publication; 53 (3) the known or poten-
tial rate of error;54 and (4) whether the principle was generally ac-
cepted in the relevant scientific community.
The majority noted, in passing, the applicability of the "Daubert
test" to nonscientific expert evidence. In a single footnote, the court
recognized that Rule 702 also applies to "technical, or other special-
ized knowledge" but stated that its decision was limited to scientific
evidence because that was the expertise at issue.56 The majority also
neglected to identify the differences between scientific and technical
knowledge.57
After Daubert, judges followed a two-step test when faced with
scientific expert testimony.58 First, they determined whether the prof-
fered evidence was scientific or nonscientific evidence.5 9  Second,
assuming the evidence was scientific, they discharged their gate-
keeping responsibilities by determining if the evidence was relevant
(1994) (asserting that "[tihe Court's instructions are quite clear- Rule 702 authorizes courts to
scrutinize only the 'scientific validity' of the 'principles and methodology' used by an expert -
not the persuasiveness of the 'conclusions' so generated. An expert's principles and methodol-
ogy, alone, are the focus of Rule 702").
49 See id. The Newtonian concept or Newtonian science is based on a methodology by
which a scientist forms a hypothesis and then undertakes experiments and observations to vali-
date or refute the hypothesis. See id. at 2276. Sir Isaac Newton used this experimental method-
ology to derive his law of mechanics. See id.
o See id.
5' See id.
52 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1992).
53 See id.
*4 See id. at 594.
55 See id. (incorporating the former "Frye test" as one of four factors a court must con-
sider when evaluating scientific expert testimony).
56 See id. at 590, n.8.
57 See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
58 See McClellan, supra note 2, at 1743 ("[Ihe very first question such court should ask upon
every proffer of expert testimony is whether the testimony is of a scientific or nonscientific





and reliable.60 Where the expert evidence was nonscientific, judges
were left to devise their own methods to determine the appropriate
standard for admissibility.
Unconvinced that the Frye test should be replaced with the ma-
jority's "general observations," the Chief Justice challenged the ma-
jority's holding in his dissent.6' More specifically, the Chief Justice
criticized the majority's failure to determine whether its decision
should also apply to "technical or other specialized knowledge. '62 He
argued that "countless more questions will surely arise" when district
judges attempt to apply the Court's "teachings. '6 3  Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent did more than note the majority's failure to ad-
dress some of the key issues presented by the Daubert case; it fore-
shadowed a controversy that would last for several years.
C. Post-Daubert Fallout: The Admissibility of Nonscientific Evidence
The Daubert Court's demarcation of scientific and nonscientific
evidence resulted in a great deal of controversy and inconsistency
among federal courts. Following Daubert, legal commentators dis-
agreed about the scope of Daubert and offered varying views about
its applicability to nonscientific expert testimony. Federal judges
were equally divided. With no guidance from the Court, each Circuit
utilized a separate standard for admitting nonscientific evidence, and
thus, the type of analysis employed varied substantially among the
Circuits.64 As a result of the Court's silence on the proper standard
for determining the admissibility of nonscientific evidence, four
trends developed.65
The first trend, utilized solely by the Sixth Circuit, applied a lit-
eral application of the four-part Daubert analysis to nonscientific evi-
6o See id.
61 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
62 See id. at 600-601. ("Does all this dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis
of 'technical or other specialized knowledge' - the other types of expert knowledge to which
Rule 702 applies - or are the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?").
63 Id. at 600. ("I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to
know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifi-
abiity' and I suspect some of them will be too.").
See Needham, supra note 3, at 550. For a comprehensive analysis on the application of
the Daubert test to nonscientific evidence by appellate courts, see Lynn R. Johnson, et al., Ex-
pert Testimony in Federal Court: Frye. Daubert, and Joiner, SC33 A.L.L-A.B.A. 177 (1998)
(reviewing the effect of Daubert in appellate courts); McClellan, supra note 2, at 1721 (analyz-
ing the effect of Daubert on the various circuit courts and asserting that all expert testimony
should be derived from a reliable basis); Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in the Federal
Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert
Testimony, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1379 (1997) (proposing that trial courts should evaluate non-
scientific expert testimony based on the expert's data and reasoning or methodology, not cre-
dentials).
65 See Needham, supra note 3, at 550; Laser, supra note 64, at 1389.
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dence. In Berry v. City of Detroit,66 the Sixth Circuit applied the four
factors to nonscientific testimony with an unsettling result. In Berry,
the expert witness was a retired sheriff with four years experience at
the Department of Justice and a degree in sociology.67 In a wrongful
death action against the City for the shooting death of the plaintiff's
son by the police, the witness testified that in his expert opinion the
police department failed to adequately discipline its officers. 68 After
identifying the testimony as nonscientific, the court applied the Dau-
bert test and the appellate court excluded the testimony because the
theory had never been formally tested, subjected to peer review, or
maintained general acceptance in its field.69 By simply glossing over
the four factors in Daubert, which were clearly inapplicable to the
expert's testimony, the Sixth Circuit raised serious concerns about the
applicability of Daubert to nonscientific evidence.
The second trend demonstrates other courts' adherence to Dau-
bert's general principle that expert testimony must be "reliable," but
resistance to the notion that each of Daubert's factors must be present
for admissibility.70 Unlike Berry, these courts did not apply a literal
interpretation of Daubert, but rather focused on applying factors that
are appropriate for evaluating nonscientific testimony. Two cases
illustrate the reasoning used by these courts. In United States v.
Kayne,71 the First Circuit considered the admissibility of expert testi-
mony by coin evaluation experts. In Kayne, the defendants estab-
lished a coin brokerage that engaged in the business of valuing and
pricing coins for resale, and were alleged to have sold coins of a
lesser value and quality than that represented to customers. 72 On ap-
peal from mail fraud convictions, the defendants argued that the evi-
66 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
67 See id. at 1348-49.
68 See id. at 1344.
69 See id. at 1350-51 (failing to make an inquiry into the theory's rate of error).
70 See Laser, supra note 64, at 1394; see also Needham, supra note 3, at 553-554. This
approach has been followed by the First, Third and Fifth Circuits. See, e.g., Den Norske Bank
AS v. First National Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49, 57-58 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying Daubert in
determining that a bank expert was sufficiently reliable based on his forty-year career and fa-
miliarity with the types of commercial agreements at issue); Unites States v. 14.38 Acres of
Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing a lower court's decision to exclude the
expert testimony of a civil engineer and real estate appraiser as "speculative"); Pedraza v. Jones,
71 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court's decision to exclude testimony of drug
withdrawal by a thirty-year heroin addict for failure to satisfy the "indicia of reliability [test]
outlined in Dauber'); Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (excluding
the testimony of an economist regarding the work life expectancy of an oilfield worker based on
insufficient data); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1236-38 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting the testimony of two economists on antitrust matters based
on the reliability of the experts' methodology, but not citing to the recently decided Daubert
decision).
71 90F.3d7 (lstCir. 1996).
72 See id. at9-10.
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dence of the value of the coins, offered by coin dealers who testified
as experts, was inadmissible based on the impropriety of the subject
of expert testimony.7 The court, however, upheld the trial judge's
decision to admit the testimony.74 Rather than utilize the four-part
Daubert test, the court focused on the fact that the experts were expe-
rienced, there was a carefully established chain of custody, and that
the appraisals were sufficiently current.75
Similarly, in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co.,7 6 the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirned the exclusion of the testimony of an
accident reconstruction expert in a products liability action brought
after a forklift fell over the side of a ramp and killed a man.77 The
court held that the district court properly excluded the testimony of
the plaintiffs reconstruction expert because he did not have proper
training.78 The court made specific reference to Daubert and the ob-
ligation to ensure that all expert testimony is relevant and concluded
that the expert's reconstruction did not "fit" the facts of the case, and
therefore, was unreliable.79 The court appeared to rely solely on the
general principles of Daubert that evidence must be relevant and reli-
able, but made no mention of Daubert's four-factor analysis.
8 0
In the third trend, some Circuits inconsistently applied Daubert
to nonscientific evidence.8 1 For example, the Seventh Circuit stated
courts must assess an expert's methodology to determine the reliabil-
ity of the testimony.82 In Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick,
8 3
the plaintiffs filed a securities fraud complaint against an accounting
firm for certifying the false financial statements of a real estate devel-
opment on which the plaintiffs relied for investments.84 On appeal,
the court considered whether the plaintiffs' trial expert, the manager
of another accounting firm, was properly permitted to testify.85 The
decision to admit the testimony was reversed on the lower court's
failure to assess the reliability of the expert's methodology, which
appeared to utilize the incorrect standard of valuation. 86 More re-
cently the same Circuit failed to utilize this reliability standard in Ro-
71 See id. at 11.
74 See id. at 12.71 See id. at 12.
76 36 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 1994).
77 See id. at 280.
78 See id. at 289.
79 See id. at 290.
" See id.
81 See Laser, supra note 64, at 1399-1400.
82 See id. at 1400.
3 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993).
'4 See id. at 185-86.
s5 See id. at 186.
16 See id. at 186-87.
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back v. VIP. Transportation Inc.87 In that case, the Seventh Circuit
reviewed a lower court's decision to exclude the testimony of an en-
gineer who devised a method of determining whether an automobile
had malfunctioned.88 In overruling the decision and concluding that
the expert should have been permitted to testify, the court made no
inquiry into the expert's methodology. Rather, the Court focused on
the fact that the expert's data was subject to verification. 89 These
cases provide only one example of the inconsistent application of
Daubert to nonscientific testimony within the same Circuit.90
In the final approach, some courts asserted that the Daubert test
should be limited solely to scientific evidence. 91 These courts theo-
rized that nonscientific expert testimony does not present the same
special concerns as expert testimony because nonscientific evidence
is based on experience, not scientific methodology. 92 For instance in
Compton v. Subaru of America,93 the Tenth Circuit held that the trial
court erred in applying the Daubert test to determine whether an en-
gineer was fit to testify as an expert.94 The court concluded that the
engineer was not testifying based on a "particular reasoning or meth-
odology," and found that Daubert was not applicable.95 The Tenth
Circuit stated that "[t]he language in Daubert makes clear the factors
outlined by the Court are applicable only when a proffered expert re-
lies on some [scientific] principle or methodology . . . [i]n other
words, application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases
where expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training"
90 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1996).
8 See id. at 1215.
8 See id. at 1216.
90 See Laser, supra note 64, at 1399-1402 (citing several other examples in the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits).
91 See Needham, supra note 3, at 551-552; see also Laser, supra note 64, at 1391; United
States v. Arevalo-Gamboa, No. 94-50236, 1995 WL 623746, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1995)
(holding that the Daubert standard was not applicable when evaluating expert testimony re-
garding drug trafficking because the decision "applies to scientific testimony"); United States v.
Mudrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Daubert to the expert testimony of
a forensic chemist, but failing to apply that same standard to a police officer); Iacobelii Constr.,
Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d. 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1114 (1996)
(finding that the lower court's reliance on Daubert to evaluate the affidavits of a geotechnical
consultant and underground construction consultant "was misplaced"); Thomas v. Newton Int'l
Enter., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that "Daubert was clearly confined to
the evaluation of scientific expert testimony"); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that respondent's reliance on Daubert was mistaken because "[Daubert]
dealt specifically with the admissibility of scientific evidence").
92 See Needham, supra note 3, at 551.
93 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1042 (1996).




and that Daubert "had little bearing" on nonscientific expert testi-
mony.96
These four trends illustrate the lack of uniformity that results
when courts are left without guidance on issues as challenging as the
admissibility of expert testimony. Without instruction as to the means
for applying the Daubert rule to nonscientific evidence, the courts
employed different methods for evaluating evidence. The courts also
struggled to distinguish scientific from nonscientific evidence, a task
that in some cases is nearly impossible. 97 Eventually recognizing this,
the Supreme Court attempted to address these inconsistencies in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 98
IX. THE KUMHO TIRE CO. V. CARMICHAEL DEcISION
On July 6, 1993, a fatal car accident occurred when the rear pas-
senger tire of a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out. The
Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the tire maker and its
distributor (collectively known as "Kumho Tire"), asserting the tire
was defective.99 The undisputed cause of the blowout was tire sepa-
ration, which occurs when the tread of a tire separates from the inner
steel-belted carcass. 10° The plaintiffs rested heavily on the expert tes-
timony of Dennis Carlson Jr., an engineer and tire consultant.01 Ac-
cording to Carlson, the separation in this case was likely the result of
one of two causes: "overdeflection" or a defect in the tire.102 Overde-
flection is a type of tire misuse that occurs when a tire is underin-
flated.'03 The result of overdeflection is too much weight on the tire,
thereby generating heat that causes the tire's chemical bond to break-
down.104 Carlson theorized that if the cause of the tire blowout was
overdeflection, four possible physical symptoms would be present
upon examination of the tire including: (1) greater treadwear on the
tire's shoulder than center; (2) signs of bead groove; (3) signs of dete-
rioration on the sidewalls of the tire; and (4) marks on the rim flange
of the tire. t0 5 Carlson opined further that unless at least two of the
96 See id. Nevertheless, the court still concluded that the expert was qualified to testify
under Rule 702 because of his experience and training, not scientific principles. See id.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 120, 140.
98 See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167,1171 (1999).
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. The District Court had no doubt as to Carlson's credentials, which included a
master's degree in mechanical engineering, ten years work experience at Michelin America,
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four symptoms were not present, then a manufacturer or design defect
must have caused the separation.
106
The defendants moved to exclude Carlson's testimony because
his unique methodology failed to meet the reliability requirement of
Rule 702 as enunciated in Daubert.10 7 The district court agreed with
the defendant that it had a duty to act as a gatekeeper, even though
Carlson's testimony was technical rather than scientific, and con-
cluded that the testimony failed to satisfy the reliability factors of
Daubert.10 8 The court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgement and the plaintiffs requested reconsideration, contending
that the court's application of Daubert was too inflexible.'0 9 Upon
reconsideration, the court agreed that Daubert should be applied more
liberally, but concluded that the testimony still lacked sufficient reli-
ability and affirmed its earlier decision. 10 The Eleventh Circuit re-
viewed the district court's legal decision de novo and reversed.,
The appellate court emphasized that the Daubert court explicitly lim-
ited its holding to evidence based on scientific principles rather than
nonscientific testimony such as Carlson' S.112 As such, the appellate
court concluded the district court erred in applying Daubert at all, as
Carlson's testimony was beyond the scope of the Daubert decision.
113
The plaintiffs appealed the exclusion of their expert testimony and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the Court fi-
nally answered Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns in Daubert. The
Court held that the gate-keeping duties of the trial judge applies not
only to scientific expert testimony, but to all expert testimony." 4
There were several parts to the Court's reasoning. Justice Breyer
first pointed to the language of Rule 702.15 The rule itself makes no
106 See id. at 1172. Carlson conceded that: (1) the tire showed greater wear on the shoulder
than the center, (2) there were some signs of bead groove, (3) the tire showed some discolora-
tion, (4) there were marks on the rim flange, and (5) there were two punctures in the tire that
were inadequately repaired (which may also cause the type of heat that results in separation).
See id. at 1172-73. However, Carlson argued that these symptoms were not significant and
were not the cause of the separation. See id. at 1173.
107 See id. at 1172. Carlson's testimony was also challenged because it assumed certain
background facts in dispute. See id. at 1171-72. For example, he assumed the tire had put on a
significant amount of miles before the accident, but in fact, the definitive evidence suggested
that the Carmichaels had put on 7,000 miles in the two months they owned the used minivan.
See id. at 1172.
'0' See id. at 1173.
109 See id.
110 See id.
III See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
112 See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1173 (1999).
113 See id.




distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other
specialized" knowledge; rather, the Rule's reliability standard applies
to all expert testimony that falls within its scope." 6 According to
Justice Breyer, the word "knowledge" in the rule, not "scientific,
technical or other specialized," establishes the standard of evidentiary
reliability.11 7 Daubert was only limited to scientific testimony "be-
cause that was the nature of the expertise at issue."" More signifi-
cantly, the majority concluded the evidentiary rationale that under-
scored the Court's gatekeeping determination in Daubert was not
limited to scientific knowledge.n 9 Rules 702 and 703 permit experts
to testify to their opinions, including ones not based on firsthand
knowledge, subject to the knowledge and experience of their disci-
pline.120 Thus, the testimonial latitude applies to all experts, not
solely scientific ones.'
Finally, Justice Breyer concluded that judges would not be able
to uphold their gatekeeping responsibilities if there were a distinction
between scientific and other types of expert testimony.122 There is no
identifiable line between types of expert testimony and, in some
cases, there is overlap between disciplines. 123 The line would have to
be eliminated for courts to properly carry out their duties. Thus,
based on the language of the Rule itself, as well as the difficulty in
distinguishing between scientific and nonscientific evidence, the
Court concluded that the Daubert test applies to all types of expert
testimony.
The majority also addressed the issue of whether a trial judge
may consider the factors set forth in Daubert when evaluating the re-
liability of nonscientific expert testimony 24 and decided this issue in
the affirmative. The majority stated that under Daubert, the Rule 702
inquiry is a "flexible one" and the factors are not a "definitive check-
list or test."'2 Instead, the inquiry of the judge should be based on
the facts of each case. 126 Justice Breyer wrote:
116 See !a4
117 See id.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. 579,589-90 (1992).
118 See Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174 (1999); see also Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590 n.8.




12 See id. at 1175 (concluding that the line between scientific and nonscientific evidence is
unclear and "conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines
capable of application in particular cases").
124 See id.
'25 See id.126 See id.
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The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out,
nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability of
the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for
subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind
of evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circum-
stance of the particular case at issue. 27
Thus, to the extent it is helpful, a trial court may, but need not neces-
sarily, use the four-factor test set forth in Daubert.
128
The Kumho Tire Court also noted that trial judges should be
given "considerable leeway" in determining how to assess an expert's
reliability and whether special proceedings are required to investigate
that reliability. 29 Presumably, this means that a trial judge is entitled
to use factors of his own choosing, depending on the specifics of the
case, to determine an expert's reliability. Moreover, the decision by a
trial judge to permit or exclude an expert's testimony is subject to an
abuse of discretion standard. 130 The Court intended this standard to
assure that a trial judge Would have the authority to avoid undue ex-
pense or delay in determining an expert's reliability.13
1
In the immediate case, the Court held that the trial court's find-
ings that Carlson's methodology was neither reliable nor beyond "the
range where experts might reasonably differ," was reasonable and
justified. 32 The specific issue, the Court asserted, was not the gen-
eral reasonableness of a tire expert's visual and tactile inspection to
determine whether a tire was defective.1 33 Rather, the specific issue
was the reasonableness of this approach coupled with Carlson's two-
factor test for analyzing the data.134 In concluding Carlson's method-
ology was not sufficiently reliable, the Court found there was no indi-
cation that other experts in the industry used Carlson's two-factor test
'2 Id. at 1176.
'2 The majority stated:
[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in
Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an ex-
pert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceed-
ings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether that





132 See id. at 1177.
133 See id.
134 See id. at 1177-78 ('The relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine
the cause of this tire's separation.").
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or that tire experts in Carlson's position normally made finite distinc-
tions such as the ones Carlson based his theory upon. 35 Nor does any
other individual make reference to or support Carlson's theory in arti-
cles or papers, despite the prevalence of tire testing. 136 In sum, the
Court agreed with the district court that Carlson's methodology failed
to meet the standard in Daubert and no countervailing factor coun-
seled for admissibility. 37 Hence, the Court reversed the judgment of
the appellate court and affirmed the discretionary authority of the
district judge to determine the reliability of expert testimony based on
the particular facts of a case, subject to review for abuse of discre-
tion. 38
II. APPLYING KUMHO TIRE IN THE REAL WORLD: THE PRACTICAL
EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
In Kumho Tire, the majority attempted to solve the inconsistency
that resulted from Daubert by abolishing the distinction between sci-
entific and nonscientific evidence under Rule 702. Yet, while at-
tempting to solve one problem, the Court created others. The deci-
sion failed to provide a standard for the reliability of nonscientific
expert testimony and a means for evaluating that reliability. 139 This
leaves trial judges in a quandary by requiring them to evaluate the
reliability of nonscientific expert testimony, but providing no means
for accomplishing the task.
A. The Shortcomings of the Court's Decision
The first problem with the Kumho Tire decision is that it failed to
establish a standard of reliability for nonscientific expert testimony.
In Daubert, the Court concluded that an expert's testimony must be
based on scientific knowledge in order to meet the "standard of evi-
dentiary reliability."' 4 When scientific evidence is at issue, the trial
judge examines only the "scientific validity" of the "principles and
methodology" used by the proposed expert, not the conclusions them-
13S See id. at 1178.
136 See id.
137 See id.
131 See id. at 1179.
139 This Comment focuses on the Kumho decision with respect to the reliability of an ex-
pert's testimony. Note that Rule 702 also requires that evidence be relevant and "assist the trier
of fact." FED. R EviD. 702. The Court's treatment of that portion of the Rule in Daubert and
Kumho seems sufficiently applicable to nonscientific expert testimony and will not be covered
here.
140 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590. ('The adjective 'scientific'
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge'
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.").
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selves. 141 To be valid, scientific knowledge must be derived from the
scientific method, which is based on principles of Newtonian science
that ensure the validity of the scientific methodology by validation
and re-testing.142 Thus, scientific expert testimony that is supported
by appropriate validation has a heightened likelihood of reliability,
and that reliability, in turn, helps to ensure that scientific evidence
which carries an aura of infallibility will not unjustifiably effect the
judge, jury or outcome of a trial.
The Newtonian method, however, cannot ensure the reliability of
nonscientific evidence. Opinions and theories founded on nonscien-
tific conclusions do not lend themselves to validation by the Newto-
nian process. 4 3 Rather, they generally utilize an analysis based on
experience or specialized knowledge, often subjective, and not sus-
ceptible to re-testing. 14  For instance, it is not possible for one expert
to validate another's opinion on the modus operandi of a drug dealer.
Both experts have different subjective interpretations of what they
observe and both will use different experiences when interpreting
those observations. These experiences and observations cannot be re-
tested for accuracy or duplicated in a laboratory.
Nevertheless, if the reliability requirement of Rule 702 is im-
plicit in the term "scientific knowledge," then there must be some
equivalent requirement for nonscientific expert testimony in the terms
"technical knowledge" and "specialized knowledge. '1 45 Such a basis
is essential to guarantee that nonscientific expert testimony meets the
141 See supra text accompanying note 48.
142 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2283-84. It is commonplace for one laboratory to
double-check the accuracy of another's testing by attempting to duplicate the results. See id. at
2284-85. This method is also known as external proficiency testing. See id; see also J. Brook
L thram, The "Same Intellectual Rigor" Test Provides an Effective Method for Determining the
Reliability of All Expert Testimony, Without Regard to Whether the Testimony Comprises "Sci-
entific Knowledge" or "Technical or Other Specialized Knowledge," 28 U. MFI. L. REV.
1053, 1064-65 (1998) ("The hallmark of a scientific principle is its falsifiability, i.e., its amena-
bility to being tested to see if it is false .... What distinguishes scientific from nonscientific
expert testimony is the former's application of general scientific (i.e., falsifiable) principles to
the specific facts of a case. The reliability of scientific testimony depends, in turn, on whether
the general principles applied by the expert have been validated through appropriate testing.").
143 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2284.
144 See Lathram supra note 142, at 1065. This is not to suggest that scientific principles
are never at play in a nonscientific experts opinion, just not the basis of the testimony. For
instance, a beekeeper that has observed countless bee flights can certainly testify as to his opin-
ion as to why bees take off into the wind. Clearly, there is a valid scientific reason for this be-
havior, but that is not the basis of the testimony. See id. at 1065-1067 (citing Berry v. City of
Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994). This, in fact, was the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Kumho Tire. That court concluded that while the laws of physics and chemistry were underly-
ing Calson's testimony, his opinion was based on his experience with failing tires. See Car-
michael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (1997), overruled by Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
145 See Tamarelli, supra note 5, at 1195.
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requirements of Rule 702. The Court, however, provides no such
standard. Instead, the majority attempted to sidestep this issue by
stating that the reliability requirement is found in the word "knowl-
edge," not "scientific knowledge."' 146 However, without further defi-
nition, this standard is insufficient because it offers trial judges no
basis by which to measure the reliability of a nonscientific expert.
This leaves trial judges in the dark without a method or means of de-
termining whether such testimony meets the requirements of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, and increases the possibility that either junk
science will be inadvertently admitted by a trial judge or reliable tes-
timony will be excluded.
Second, even assuming the Court was correct that knowledge in
a particular field, scientific or nonscientific, is sufficient to form the
basis for the reliability requirement of Rule 702, the Court failed to
devise a proper means for evaluating that expert's knowledge. In
Daubert, the Court identified four factors for trial judges to consider
when evaluating scientific knowledge: whether the theory or tech-
nique has been tested, whether it is subject to peer review and publi-
cation, the known or potential rate of error, and whether there is gen-
eral acceptance of the theory or technique. The four factors in Dau-
bert were devised to provide guidance for trial judges when analyzing
expert testimony based on science.147 Each factor is geared toward
evaluating scientific methodology. 148 Upon closer examination, it is
clear that those factors do not provide an accurate test for nonscien-
tific testimony.149 Nonscientific expert testimony is not based on the
scientific method, and attempting to utilize those factors to evaluate
knowledge not based on the scientific precept will be unsuccessful.
'46 See Kumho Tire, 119 S. CL at 1174. The Court stated the Rule 702 makes no relevant
distinction between scientific knowledge and other types, and that any type of knowledge may
be the basis of expert testimony. Id. ("Neither is the evidentiary rationale that underlay the
Court's basic Daubert 'gatekeeping' determination limited to 'scientific' knowledge. Daubert
pointed out that Federal Rules 702 and 703 grant expert witnesses testimonial latitude unavail-
able to other witnesses on the 'assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in
the knowledge and experience of his discipline."'). While it is true that Rules 702 and 703
provide latitude for testifying experts, the Court's analysis is incomplete. That latitude provided
under Rules 702 and 703 cannot provide for the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony.
First, Rule 702 requires that expert testimony be reliable but does not provide a standard of
reliability. Second, Rule 703 permits experts to testify based on information of the type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in their field, but makes. no mention of the reliability of that
information. Therefore, the Court's analysis is useful, but incomplete.
147 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2283 (arguing that "[n]either the essential test enun-
ciated in Daubert, nor the factors listed by the Court are applicable to nonscientific opinion").
148 See ii
149 See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1992) ("Faced with a prof-
fer of expert testimony, then, the trial judge must determine... whether the reasoning or meth-
odology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or meth-
odology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.").
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An example is illustrative. Prior to Kumho Tire, the Sixth Cir-
cuit attempted a literal application of the Daubert factors to the expert
testimony of a police officer. In Berry v. City of Detroit,150 an action
was brought against Officer Joseph Hall for improper use of deadly
force, and the City of Detroit for failing to properly train its police
officers.' 51 Lee Berry, Jr., the decedent, was driving his van when he
was stopped by Officer Hall for committing several misdemeanor
traffic violations.1 52 While the actual events that occurred after Berry
was pulled over were in dispute, it was undisputed that a struggle en-
sued during which Hall shot Berry in the back.153 At trial, Hall
claimed that Berry attacked him, and that he accidentally shot him
during the struggle, however, the Plaintiffs expert contested Officer
Hall's version of the facts.' 54 The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff for six million dollars. 5
On appeal, the court expressed grave concerns about the qualifi-
cations of the plaintiff's expert, although his credentials included a
degree in sociology, a masters degree in education, work experience
as deputy sheriff and a sheriff, and experience administering a num-
ber of seminars on police management.156 In his testimony, the expert
asserted that the events could not have happened as Officer Hall de-
scribed, and that the City failed to properly train and discipline its
officers. 57 In holding that the expert was not reliable, the Sixth Cir-
cuit concluded that Daubert's gatekeeping function applies to all ex-
pert testimony, and attempted to utilize the Daubert factors.15 8 First,
the court asserted that there had been no testing of the expert's disci-
pline theory.159 Second, there was no evidence in the record to reveal
that there had been a peer review or publication of the theory.16° Fi-
nally, the court pointed out that there was no evidence the expert's
theory was generally accepted in the expert's field.16 1 Based on the
expert's failure to meet any of these criteria, the court excluded the
testimony.
0 25 F.3d 1324 (6th Cir. 1994).





16 See id. at 1348 ("As we view the record, Postill did not have the qualifications to testify
as an expert on this question, and, if he did, no proper foundation was laid for his ultimate
opinion.").
'57 See id. at 1343.
151 See id. at 1349.
"9 See id. at 1350.
'6 See id.




The Berny decision illustrates the difficulties of applying the
Daubert test to nonscientific expert testimony. The expert in Berry
was a former sheriff with a substantial amount of education and expe-
rience in law enforcement. His opinion was based on his education
and personal experience in law enforcement. Yet, such a basis for
expert testimony defies an application of Daubert. The expert's
opinion simply was not quantifiable under Daubert. This, however,
does not mean the testimony was not reliable. For example, does a
police detective that specializes in undercover drug work with 30
years experience have a testable hypothesis regarding his observa-
tions about the actions of drug dealers? Probably not, but he certainly
has a wealth of experience that may be both relevant and reliable to a
criminal trial. Similarly, it is unlikely that an experienced mechanic
that has worked on hundreds of faulty brakes has published a paper
on the topic. Nevertheless, his testimony is likely to be reliable and
relevant in a products liability trial regarding faulty brakes. In both
cases, the expert's testimony would be based on years of experience
and personal knowledge, and this testimony, while perhaps not quan-
tifiable under Daubert, may nevertheless be reliable.
By either ignoring or overlooking the shortcomings of the deci-
sion, the Court passed the burden of evaluating nonscientific expert
testimony to trial judges. The Court stated: "The trial court must have
the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliabil-
ity, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceed-
ings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides
whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable." 162 This
leaves trial judges with the difficult task of evaluating experts without
a reliable means for accomplishing that task.
B. Judicial Anarchy: The Result of Leaving too Little Guidance and
too much Discretion to Trial Judges
The Court's holding in Kumho Tire will lead to a number of
problems. The first stems from the Court's failure to properly iden-
tify a standard of reliability for nonscientific expert testimony or de-
fine the term "knowledge." Trial judges will have no analog to the
scientific method to measure the reliability of nonscientific evidence.
Without guidance as to a method a nonscientific expert must use to
ensure the reliability of his testimony, the Court opened the proverbial
floodgates to the admission of unreliable testimony.
While the fear of junk science based on nonscientific evidence is
less pronounced than that based on scientific evidence, it still presents
162 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999).
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a very real threat.163  In fact, because nonscientific evidence is not
based on the scientific method, the threat may be greater.x64 As pre-
viously stated, the results of nonscientific evidence cannot generally
be duplicated, further calling into question the accuracy of those
opinions, 65 This fact is especially true in the area of social sci-
ences. 166 For instance, in social science research there is a great po-
tential for bias because results are based on human beings studying
human beings creating a greater likelihood for human error or subjec-
tive interpretation of the results. 167 In addition, social science re-
search creates a number of methodology problems, perhaps greater
than other nonscientific disciplines.' 68 Social science hypotheses are
not testable, and many of the studies use small and unrepresentative
samples that are often presented without helpful comparison.
169
Clearly, without any direction on what standard nonscientific experts
must meet, trial courts will doubtlessly be forced to make decisions
that ultimately exclude reliable experts or admit unreliable ones.
A second problem results from the Court's decision to give trial
judges discretion in determining how to evaluate nonscientific evi-
dence. A judge struggling to determine whether to permit an expert
to testify on a nonscientific theory will first consult the standard set
forth in Daubert. If the evidence is nonscientific, the Daubert stan-
dard will be inapplicable. Under Kumho Tire, however, the judge
will still have a duty to determine its admissibility. With no further
guidance, each judge will make an individualized decision based on
the factors he deems important. This widespread individualized deci-
sion making will lead to two problems.
First, judges may abuse or "misuse" their discretion. Each Cir-
cuit may use different factors, in addition to or in place of the Dau-
bert factors, to resolve the issue of whether a particular expert will be
'63 See Imwinkelied, supra note 2, at 1121; see also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koeing,
The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C.L.
REv. 91, 128 (1993) (conducting a review of the way partisan organizations distort social sci-
ence evidence in anici briefs submitted to the Supreme Court and concluding that "fi]unk social
science is characterized by quotes from social scientific research taken out of context, mislead-
ing statistical presentations, denigration of studies whose results conflicted with the argument,
and anecdotes masquerading as social science").
164 See Imwinkelied, supra note 2, at 2279.
's See id. at 2280.
166 See Laura Etlinger, Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Lnv: A Proposal to
Focus on Evidentiary Use, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1259 (1995) (providing an in depth study of the use
and reliability of social science expert testimony in domestic violence cases and stating that
there are a number of problems with the use of social science research by courts including re-
search and judicial bias, natural tension between science and the adversary system, inherent
problems with social science methodology and limitations of existing evidence rules).
167 See id. at 1276-79.




permitted to testify. Some may make their decision based on the ex-
pert's experience and education, while others may place more weight
on the expert's credibility. Other judges may place more emphasis on
countervailing, but equally unscientific, views in the field. It should
be recalled that after Daubert, each court employed a somewhat dif-
ferent means for determining the admissibility of nonscientific expert
testimony. 170 These phenomena will reoccur after Kumho Tire be-
cause the decision makes it unclear to parties, attorneys and even
judges what factors and criteria are necessary to use nonscientific ex-
pert testimony.
Another problem that could stem from individualized decision-
making is that judges may take the opposite approach. Rather than
use many different factors for evaluating the admissibility of an ex-
pert's testimony, judges may simply conduct an "overview" of ex-
pert's testimony. If the testimony seems reliable or generally accept-
able, the court should permit the expert to testify. This method would
be similar to the Frye test, which based admissibility on whether the
principle used by the expert was generally accepted in the relevant
field of study.' 7 ' Much like the Frye test, it would have several short-
comings. 7 2 For example, this method would not have identifiable
boundaries, thus leaving unclear what credential an expert must pos-
sess to be able to testify on a nonscientific topic. 7 3 Another potential
problem that may occur from using this "overview" approach would
be the exclusion of testimony regarding novel or developing theories
because there is little information on which to base reliability. 174
These are only a few of a number of problems that will occur as
a result of the Court's decision. The Court gave trial judges too much
discretion on a topic they know little about, with no guidance for
making the admissibility decisions. The result will undoubtedly be
rampant individualized decision-making; judges will apply a number
of different criteria or general principles to decide whether to permit a
nonscientific expert to testify. The source of these problems is the
Court's failure to adequately address the reliability prong of Rule 702.
Consequently, the solution lies in rethinking and reworking that part
of the decision.
170 See supra Part IC.
"' See supra Part LA.
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C. A Brief Solution to a Difficult Problem
The Supreme Court must rethink its decision in Kumho Tire.
The decision has left judges without a consistent or dependable stan-
dard for determining the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony.
To do this, the Court must first define the term "knowledge" in Rule
702. A standard must be set for technical or other specialized knowl-
edge to provide judges with a measuring stick to determine what
standard an expert testifying based on those disciplines must meet
before testifying.
Scientific experts are permitted to testify if the method they used
to form their opinion is scientifically sound. Similarly, nonscientific
experts should only be permitted to testify if the means by which their
opinions are drawn are also sound.175 However, because the scientific
method is not a workable means for evaluating nonscientific expert
testimony, another standard must be devised as a parallel to the sci-
entific method, but tailored specifically for "nonscientific knowl-
edge." Nonscientific expert testimony generally draws on the ex-
pert's personal experience, training and skills. Thus, the standard
must evaluate the means by which the expert reaches his conclusions.
This Comment suggests that the standard of reliability be based both
on the degree to which the expert is qualified through his education,
credentials, skills, and experience, and, where applicable, the method
by which he derived those conclusions. At first glance, this standard
appears to feed into the notion that the party with the expert who has
the most impressive credential will always prevail. 76 Therefore, for
this standard to be effective, it is essential that the factors that courts
use to evaluate experts focus on more than just an expert's degrees
and awards.
The factors used to evaluate the reliability of nonscientific expert
testimony based on the above definition must, like scientific expert
testimony, focus on the methodology or process by which the conclu-
sion was formed. In some cases, the Daubert factors may be useful.
Generally, however, the factors do not seem to fairly evaluate the re-
liability of nonscientific expert testimony. Nonscientific expert testi-
mony is generally derived from personal experience or expertise in a
particular field.177 Therefore, the factors must require judges to ex-
175 See supra text accompanying note 48.
176 See supra text accompanying note 5.
177 See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 2289 ("Experience is to nonscientific experts as
experimentation is to scientists. [n]onscientific experts are 'experientially qualified.' Their
experience largely is their expertise.") (citations omitted); see also Laser, supra note 64, at 1415




amine: (1) the expert's credentials, (2) whether the data the expert
used to formulate his opinion was the type reasonably used by other
expert's in the field,17 8 and (3) the methodology, if any, used by the
expert.17 9  Thus, additional or alternative factors are necessary for
courts to consider when evaluating this type of evidence. Like the
Daubert test for scientific expert testimony, the factors identified by
the Court should not be an exhaustive checklist, but a starting point
that will help guide trial courts. 8° Such a list should only be devised
after substantial research in a variety of nonscientific areas, however,
this Comment makes some suggestions that may be worthy of consid-
eration. In addition to the four factors of Daubert, when they are ap-
plicable, those factors may include: (1) the depth of the expert's edu-
cation, training or experience in the area; (2) the data from which the
expert derived his conclusions; (3) reenactments or simulations of the
expert's methodology; (4) the existence of specialized literature
dealing with the theory; (5) the extent to which the basic data may be
verified by court and jury; and (6) the availability of other experts to
evaluate the explanative theory.181
Certainly, there is some overlap between these proposed fac-
tors and the Daubert test. However, the factors ultimately employed
178 The Court's reference to Rule 703 was not an error. However, the requirement that
experts only testify based on data reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field is only one
of the criteria a court should review when examining the reliability of a nonscientific expert. See
Laser, supra note 64, at 1415 (asserting that when assessing the reliability of a nonscientific
expert, "[t]he court would have to determine whether the expert's past experiences are sufficient
in quantity and quality to constitute reliable data on which the expert can base the conclusions");
Lathram, supra note 142, at 1055 (advocating the "Same Intellectual Rigor Test" which would
admit all types of expert testimony as reliable if: "The testimony of an otherwise qualified ex-
pert is reliable, for purposes of Rule 702, when the expert has, in developing the opinions she
seeks to express in court, adhered to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded
by her professional work"); see also Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738-39 (5th Cir.
1994) (excluding rope testing expert's testimony because there was no basis for his opinion).
179 There are times when a nonscientific expert uses a methodology and that methodology
can be examined by the Court. For instance, the Court in Kumho Tire provided an example of
when the Daubert factors would be applicable to the testimony of a nonscientific expert. "[Like
an engineer], it will at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is based purely
on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, whether his
preparation is of a kind that others in the field would recognize as acceptable." Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999). Thus, in some circumstances a court will be able
to evaluate an expert's methodology. See, e.g., Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 2 F.3d
183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993) (excluding the testimony of a well-credentialed accounting expert
because the method he used to reach his conclusion was unsound).
1 0 Realistically, though, it is essential for the Court to identify factors for evaluating non-
scientific expert testimony because trial courts often employ only those factors when making a
determination. Thus, while it is important to leave the door open for special circumstances, it is
also important to lessen the burden on trial judges and accept the fact that the gate-keeping
analysis often stops after the factors have been utilized.
,' See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 2027, 2099-2101 (1994)
(proposing many of the same factors for evaluating expert psychological testimony in child
abuse cases).
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must be tailored specifically to "technical or other specialized knowl-
edge" in order to fairly evaluate testimony in those areas of expertise.
Whatever factors used, they must be identified by the Court and
clearly defined to avoid inconsistent use. The test must be revised to
appeal to the very nature of this type of testimony. The standard must
be broader and less rigid than the scientific method, but also sufficient
to keep junk science out of the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael
was a long time coming, but fell short of its mark. The Court's deci-
sion failed to make a positive change in the law because it did not
provide a sufficient basis for trial judges to evaluate the reliability of
nonscientific expert testimony. As a result of the Courts omission,
trial judges are left in a precarious situation. By asserting that the
Daubert test and its four-factor analysis is applicable to nonscientific
evidence, the Court has required federal judges to apply a standard
that simply is not applicable; the decision forces a square peg in a
round hole. This leaves the future of nonscientific expert testimony
in a state of uncertainty. Each judge will likely employ his own crite-
ria for determining admissibility, leading to a variance among the
federal circuits and a lack of predictability for litigants. Essentially,
the Court has opened the door by allowing the use of the Daubert test
when evaluating nonscientific evidence, but has kept the lights off by
not providing a cognizable means for applying it.
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